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     Over the last 25 years, dozens of governments across Asia, Africa, Latin America and 
eastern Europe have experimented with democratic decentralisation – with the devolution of 
powers and resources to elected local councils.  It is one of the fashions of our time.  But in 
most of these cases, local councils have do not have enough money to operate effectively.  
Far too little funding has been passed down to them from above, and they have been given 
few (or no) powers to collect revenue.   
     This is a deeply serious problem because adequate funding is one of the three things that 
are essential if democratic local government is to work well.  The other two are adequate 
powers and reliable accountability mechanisms.  If any of these three ‘essentials’ is present 
but weak, the local councils will limp along.  If any is absent, then they always fail.  
Inadequate funding is often a deeply serious problem, so it is common to find democratic 
local government limping along or utterly crippled by the scarcity of funds.1  This is true 
even in industrialised countries – in for example, Britain and much of the U.S. at present – 
but it has reached epidemic proportions across the developing world. 
     But what happens when a startling policy change provides elected local councils with 
substantial new funds?   We need to consider this in order to anticipate opportunities and 
problems that will arise if governments in developing countries decide to pass substantial 
resources to democratic institutions near the grassroots.  Several governments with growing 
economies (and thus growing revenues to spend) are considering such steps – partly because 
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they have become interested in a programme that has poured immense sums into elected local 
councils in India.2     
     This is the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (or MGNREGA) 
which since 2005 has given every rural household the right to demand and receive 100 days 
of employment per year at (in India terms) a reasonably generous minimum wage.  It has 
provided many tens of millions of poor families with a hedge against destitution during 
seasons in which the demand for labour is slack or nonexistent.   
    This programme is important for several reasons.  It has more formidable transparency 
mechanisms, to combat corruption, than any social programme on earth.  It reaches more 
people than any other anti-poverty initiative in the world, and in history.  It departs from the 
predominant pattern, in and beyond India, by abandoning the targeting of the poor.  Instead, it 
gives poor people the right to take advantage of it – so that it is self-targeting.  It seeks to 
inspire demands from the poor, by inculcating in them an awareness of their rights -- to work, 
to information, and to social justice – which can serve as a basis for demands.  It thus 
attempts to enhance their capacity to operate effectively and to exert influence in the public 
sphere.  It has its critics, but it has been welcomed by many – including, unexpectedly, both 
corporate and banking executives3 and ‘Maoist’ insurgents in under-developed areas of 
India.4   
     What mainly concerns us here is that the MGNREGA requires state governments in 
India’s federal system to channel at least 50% of the massive funds for this programme 
through elected councils at the local level in rural areas.  That makes this the largest 
downward transfer of funds to democratic local government ever, anywhere in the world.  In 
India since 2005, local government has struck it rich.     
     But what happens when elected local councils suddenly experience a surge in funding?  
That is the topic of this paper.  As we might expect, many good things become possible.  
Those of us who have sat in the offices of penniless local councils in various developing 
countries, and seen the despair on the faces of elected representatives and council employees, 
will naturally feel elated at the thought of generous increases in funds.   
     But we should be careful what we wish for.  Painful problems and dilemmas also arise.  
One unintended consequence is especially important.  Despite its transparency mechanisms 
which are designed to enhance accountability – and which promote it to some degree – the 
day-to-day operations of the new programme in many local arenas have undermined 
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accountability by the elected heads of local councils in two ways.  First, they have become 
less accountable (horizontally) to other elected members of their councils.  Second, they have 
become less accountable (vertically, downward) to ordinary people.  So while the 
MGNREGA has increased the provision of one of the three ‘essentials’ (adequate funding), in 
many localities, it has weakened one of the other ‘essentials’ (accountability mechanisms).  
This crucial ambiguity is examined in detail in this paper.         
     Before we proceed further, brief comments are necessary on the meanings of three terms 
used here.  ‘Politics’ looms large in this discussion -- which is appropriate and inevitable 
since democratic local government opens the door to more robust political activity at the 
grassroots.  As it is used here, the word ‘politics’ implies the interplay of ideas, interests and 
actors in pursuit of power – within but also beyond formal government structures.   
     ‘Poverty’ is also defined broadly here, and not in narrowly economistic terms.  It is not 
just a severe shortage of funds, incomes and assets, but also a severe shortage of liberties, 
opportunities and the capacity to operate effectively and to exercise influence in the public 
sphere.   
     In other words, ‘poverty’ consists in part of a severe shortage of ‘political capacity’.  
‘Political capacity’ implies four things: poor people’s political awareness, confidence, skills 
and connections (to other poor people and to allies among the non-poor).  It is surely 
appropriate to see a severe shortage of these things as one important dimension of ‘poverty’.5    
     The discussion below first reminds readers of the ways in which inadequate funding 
cripples local democracy across much of the world.  It then explains key details of the 
MGNREGA – including the transfer of substantial funds to local councils -- and discusses 
how struggles over this new money influence the behaviour (and the accountability) of 
important actors at and above the grassroots.  It then discusses the need for balance between 
funds, powers and accountability mechanisms, and analyses an ‘accountability deficit’ within 
the local councils that manage much of this programme.  After assessing an important change 
in the MGNREGA’S rules – a requirement that poor workers be paid through bank accounts 
– profiles are provided of three local council chairpersons, to illustrate the variations that 
arise in different places.  The paper then tackles a key issue: whether local council leaders are 
villains, victims, or both.  It concludes by arguing that enhanced transparency and greatly 
increased funds do not – on their own – suffice to make local democracy flourish.  
Accountability is also crucial, and it is harder to achieve.        
The Problem of Inadequate Funding 
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     Most readers with an interest in democratic local government understand the damaging 
impact of inadequate funding on elected local bodies, but a few comments are necessary here.  
There are two ways to ensure that local councils can obtain funds: by devolving powers to 
raise resources locally through taxes and fees, and/or by the devolving funds from higher 
levels to the councils.  The method used is far less important than the amounts of resources 
which councils acquire as a result.  In most decentralised systems across the developing 
world, they are seriously short of resources.  In many they are crippled by under-funding.            
     Such councils cannot deliver services, create assets, or respond to the needs and 
preferences of local residents.  Ordinary people quickly recognise this and lose interest in 
elected councils.  If the introduction of local democracy has been trumpeted by the 
government (as it often is), something more destructive happens.  At first, local residents 
become excited by the prospect of influencing decisions to be taken locally about the 
distinctive needs of their village or town – which the previously over-centralised system 
neither understood nor addressed.  But once a local council is elected, and citizens discover 
that it lacks the funds to meet those needs, their excitement turns to anger and alienation 
which can be politically destabilising.    
     To make matters worse, cash-starved local councils often exist alongside other institutions 
that are lavishly (and sometimes excessively) funded.  These usually take the form of ‘user 
committees’ or ‘stakeholder committees’ (water users committees, health committees, joint 
forest management committees, etc.) which are unelected or elected through less reliable 
processes than those which choose the local council.  The local committees associated with 
the World Bank social funds are another example of this.  Such parallel institutions 
undermine the legitimacy of the local council and thus of local democracy.  When ordinary 
people see that user committees are well funded and thus capable of getting things done, and 
that the local council is penniless, they naturally gravitate towards the former.  Local councils 
become disregarded or even despised.6   
     In recent years, this problem has become somewhat less serious – because of a growing 
preoccupation with ‘fragile states’.  International development agencies (including the World 
Bank) have begun to recognise that they should strengthen and not undermine mainstream 
government institutions – and at the local level, that means elected councils.  But the problem 
still exists in some countries, and even where it has gone away, local councils often remain 
very short of funds.   
     Until the MGNREGA was created in 2005, this was true across most of India.  Two 
constitutional amendments in 1993 decreed that elected bodies should be created at three 
levels – district, sub-district and local. 7  It recommended that state governments in this 
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federal system devolve substantial powers and resources to these institutions.  On paper, this 
was a huge step forward for democratic decentralisation, but in practice, the ensuing changes 
were quite modest.  This is explained by a provision in India’s constitution which gives state 
governments responsibility for local councils.  Ministers and legislators in most states were 
reluctant to give up powers and resources which they had long controlled to elected 
representatives at lower levels.  Some state governments -- between four and six out of 28 -- 
have been enthusiastic about decentralisation, but a smaller number have been hostile to it, 
and most have been lukewarm.  So the amendments of 1993 produced only a limited and 
patchy regeneration of local democracy.   
     When the MGNREGA which channels massive new funds to elected local councils was 
introduced in 2005, many observers expected that local democracy would undergo a strong 
revival.  This was, after all, the most generous increase in local government funds ever to 
occur anywhere in the world.  As we shall see, the changes which local councils have 
experienced are in many ways exhilarating, but they have also encountered complications and 
serious problems – in large part because (as we shall see below) a surge in funding is not 
enough.  Other things are also essential – most importantly, accountability which has been 
weakened in many Indian villages by the MGNREGA.       
The Creation of the MGNREGA  
     In 2004, a multi-party alliance led by the Congress Party won a parliamentary election in 
India.  This victory was widely reported in the Indian and international media as the result of 
a revolt of the rural poor against the previous government’s emphasis on globalization and 
economic liberalization.  This was a myth.  The Congress and its allies were more strongly 
supported by prosperous groups and urban dwellers than by the rural poor.  But the myth was 
politically useful since it made Congress-led alliance appear progressive and humane.  The 
party president, Sonia Gandhi, set out to give substance to this image and to win the support 
of the rural poor at the next national election.  They are a potent political resource.  Two-
thirds of Indians live in villages, many of them are poor, and a majority of them perceive 
themselves (sometimes inaccurately) to be poor.8  She gathered round her many of India’s 
most enlightened civil society leaders, academics and former civil servants, and asked them 
to develop ideas for progressive programmes to reduce poverty.   
     They came up with several proposals, the most important of which by far was what is now 
known as the MGNREGA.  The work which villagers were given the right to demand would 
be hard manual toil – digging ditches and wells, repairing roads, etc. – but it would provide 
poor families that had been left behind by rapid economic growth with crucial protection 
against destitution.   
     In this paper, we need to focus on the huge implications of the MNREGA for elected local 
councils.  Other aspects of the programme will be discussed at various points here, but only 
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when they become relevant to that topic.9  State governments are required by this law to 
permit local councils to manage at least 50% of MGNREGA projects, and that implies that 
immense amounts of new money will flow to them.  A small number of state governments 
have given those councils much larger shares of the programme’s projects – because they 
believe (correctly) that the work of the councils is far more transparent than the operations of 
government ministries which control the rest of the projects.  Most of the 28 state 
governments have transferred 50% of the projects to local councils, but two have not done so 
– in one case because councils were not elected until late 2010, and in the other because the 
government has broken the law by completely excluding councils from this programme.10                
     Most state governments did rather little, however, to ensure that other key features of the 
MGNREGA worked as intended.  They made little effort to mount effective campaigns to 
make villagers aware that it differed from other government programmes in that it was 
demand-driven – that all households had the right to demand and receive up to 100 days of 
employment.  (This is important because it means that the programme is open to significant 
numbers of poor people who for some reason have not received certificates showing that they 
live below the official poverty line.)  Most state governments did little to explain that the 
paper ‘job cards’, which every labourer is given, contained records of days worked which 
were supposed to match computerised records in a huge IT system – to protect labourers 
against false entries on ‘job cards’.  Nor did they do much to explain that people who did not 
receive work within 15 days of requesting it were eligible for unemployment payments.  Nor 
did most state governments do much to make sure that mass meetings at the local level (gram 
sabhas) discussed MGNREGA plans being developed by local councils, or to see to it that 
periodic social audits were held to investigate local councils’ management of the programme.  
Taken together, these features of the programme add up to the strongest set of transparency 
mechanisms in any poverty programme in the world.  But nearly all state governments were 
extremely reluctant to encourage transparency and the downward accountability which might 
result from it. 
     Crucially, most chairpersons of elected local councils share this distaste for transparency.  
They find it extremely inconvenient to be questioned about their actions in village mass 
meetings, or to submit themselves to social audits.  They are also reluctant to share power 
over decisions about MGNREGA projects with ordinary villagers – or indeed, with elected 
members of the councils that they head (a key topic discussed in more detail below).  So they 
have done little to compensate for the lack of effort by state governments to promote 
awareness – which would increase pressure on them to act accountably.  Their reluctance is 
partly explained by their resentment over one feature of the programme.  Its powerful 
transparency mechanisms focus entirely on actions by people (including them) at the local 
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level, and not on actions by official at higher levels in the administration – who swiftly began 
refusing to provide essential assistance unless local council chairpersons offered them bribes 
(again, see below).   
     A further comment is required here on local mass meetings, since the issue is complicated.   
Leaders of elected local councils, across India and all over the world, are reluctant to be 
interrogated at such meetings.  They tend strongly to hold so-called mass meetings without 
adequate (or any) publicity and/or at times when most people are busy with other activities, 
or to avoid them altogether.11  When a group of leading analysts was asked about mass 
meetings in late 2010, they concluded unanimously that mass meetings had had only a 
minimal impact – except in a modest number of localities where enlightened civil society 
organisations had worked intensively.12  This view understates somewhat the efficacy under 
this programme of mass meetings -- which are intended to complement the ‘periodic 
accountability’ represented by elections with more ‘continuous accountability’ between 
elections.  An extensive survey of villages in the state of Rajasthan found that 27% of 
workers on MGNREGA projects (that is, poor people) had participated in mass meetings in a 
district where no formidable civil society organisation had worked, and that 38% of workers 
had participated in a second district where such organisations had been active.13  These may 
sound like low percentages because they fall far short of 100%.  But since the international 
norm for participation in mass meetings is close to ‘zero’, these figures indicate that 
participation under this was programme was not trivial.  This evidence is somewhat (though 
only somewhat) more encouraging than the dismal view which predominates in discussions 
of this programme.  
     Immense sums of money have flowed to local councils under the MGNREGA.  Actual 
expenditure (as opposed to budgetary provisions recorded on paper) on this programme has 
been massive, and has risen during each year since implementation began in 2006.  The total 
outlay for the four years between 2006 and 2010 was Rs. 17.97 billion, equivalent to US$ 
395 million.  Since roughly half of this amount went to local councils, this represents a 
spectacular increase in the resources available to them.  Leaders of these councils have 
repeatedly told this writer (with great pride) that they now have more funds to spend than 
their state legislator does from the latter’s constituency development fund.  The days when 
legislators sneered at impecunious local councillors are gone.   
     The number of poor households which have obtained work under the MGNREGA is also 
enormous – making this the largest poverty programme in the world.  Between April 2006 
and March 2010, 153.03 million had done so – and the totals have increased every year.  So 
have the number of ‘persondays’ worked: 7.34 billion over that same time span.  The use of 
the term ‘persondays’, rather than ‘mandays’, is appropriate because women have 
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participated on an immense scale.  They performed 46.02% of the work between 2006 and 
2010 – and in 2010-11, they accounted for just over 50%.14     
When Local Councils Strike It Rich, People ‘Follow the Money’ 
     When abundant new funds are injected into local arenas, they attract attention.  Different 
groups of people ‘follow the money’ with different aims in mind.  The results are partly 
encouraging and partly destructive. 
     Increased MGNREGA funds generate excitement among ordinary people and elected 
members and chairpersons of local councils.  Poor people who can obtain well paid work 
under this programme see that the money may give them opportunities to earn enough to feed 
their families adequately, to send their children to school instead of to work, and to protect 
them against shocks such as sudden illnesses and illnesses.  All local residents – poor and 
non-poor -- understand that it may now be possible to create or repair local assets (school 
buildings, wells, minor roads, etc.) which have long been local priorities but which higher-
level government actors have ignored.  Ordinary people become more active in the public 
sphere because at last the resources are available there to get useful things done -- so political 
participation increases.  (That is good news in and of itself, but increased participation in 
local government has also been shown to benefit poor people.15)  Local civil society also 
becomes more vibrant.  Old, sleepy voluntary organisations revive and new organisations are 
formed because people see that collective action may influence decisions that will materially 
affect their lives.  The members and chairpersons of elected councils naturally respond with 
great relish since they have finally been given abundant resources with which to address local 
needs.  All of this is encouraging. 
   But that is only part of the story.  Other people – and some of the same people – see an 
opportunity to steal some of the new money.  Bureaucrats at higher levels are unhappy that 
such substantial funds have been passed to local councils, and they set out to force the latter 
to provide payoffs in exchange for official measurements and approvals which they must 
issue before funds are fully released to those councils.  Some of the members and 
chairpersons of the councils are also tempted to divert some of those funds – in order to 
enrich themselves, to amass funds for future election campaigns, and to pay bribes to higher-
ups.  Contractors who execute minor construction projects see an opportunity to profit from 
the MGNREGA – even though they are banned by the Act from participating.  (In most parts 
of India, the ban has worked, but contractors sometimes play a role.)  And some ordinary 
people in each locality also hanker after illicit profits.             
     The result of all of this is a complex game in which various sets of actors pursue their 
different aims.  The outcomes are almost always ambiguous.  In some localities we find that 
corruption is minimised so the constructive intentions of the programme are largely fulfilled, 
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but in others, they are for the most part thwarted.  These processes are discussed in more 
detail later in this paper, when we consider the MGNREGA from the viewpoints of various 
local actors, and when we examine a twist in the plotline of this story – a change in the rules 
of the game which altered the way that it is played and reduced corruption.  But before we 
discuss those things, further comments are needed on the three things which are ‘essential’ if 
local democracy is to work well.            
Money Isn’t Everything: A Need to Balance Funding, Powers and Accountability  
     The finances of local councils must not be seen in isolation.  Even where funding is 
generous – as it is in this case – other things may cause the system to malfunction.  Adequate 
funds must be accompanied by adequate powers and reliable accountability mechanisms – to 
ensure both the accountability of bureaucrats to elected representatives, and of elected 
representatives to ordinary people.  To reiterate: if any of these three essentials is absent, 
local democracy will fail.  If any is present but weak, local democracy will limp along.  None 
of the three essentials is absent anywhere in India.  But as we shall see, in many parts of the 
country, the latter two essentials are weak – so local councils and the MGNREGA are 
limping along.   
    Let us first consider the powers which local councils have been given under the 
MGNREGA.  There must be some sort of balance between funding and powers.  In this 
programme, we find an imbalance.  It differs from the usual imbalance.  It is quite common – 
all over the world, including in many Indian states before the MGNREGA was introduced – 
for local councils to be given significant powers, or at least significant responsibilities (which 
is not the same thing) but too little money to perform them.  This results in unfunded or 
seriously under-funded mandates.  The MGNREGA reverses this pattern.  It gives local 
councils significant new money, but too few powers over how to use it.  That is a new type of 
imbalance, but it is an imbalance nonetheless. 
     On paper, the imbalance is not immediately obvious.  The Act states that elected local 
councils should control the funds for at least half of the projects to be undertaken under the 
MGNREGA – which suggests that they will have extensive powers over decisions about 
those projects.  We also read that local councils are to engage in planning exercises, during 
which they identify a number of projects that they wish to complete, and then list them in 
order of priority.  Those which cannot be started immediately will be placed on a “shelf”, 
awaiting action later.  Elected councils higher up, at the sub-district level, are given the task 
of combining the plans made by local councils into sub-district plans – a process which does 
not at first glance seem to undermine local councils’ powers.  And then elected councils at 
the much higher district level are given the power to approve local and sub-district council 
decisions.  Since they too are elected bodies, this sounds like nothing more than a modest 
check on strange decisions made at lower levels.  So, little that we find on paper appears to 
open the door to bureaucratic meddling or bullying.          
     We might become a little suspicious when we read the sections of the Act which deal with 
transparency mechanisms.  These are so complex and formidable that at first, our attention 
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fixes upon how they work.  Only when we understand that do we ask who the targets of these 
mechanisms are – and then we discover that they are aimed entirely at local councils and 
processes at the local levels.  They do not focus on actions that occur at higher levels.   
     This means that there is an imbalance in the Act.  It gives significant new powers to actors 
at higher levels – especially to those at the sub-district level (the next level up from the 
grassroots) – at the same time as it gives significant new funds and (apparently) new powers 
to local councils.  But its transparency mechanisms seek to reveal and deter malpractice only 
at the local level.  Corrupt actors at higher levels, especially at the sub-district level, can 
exercise their new powers under cover of darkness while potent transparency mechanisms 
shine a bright light on those at the grassroots.  Hence the imbalance.   
     To make matters worse, elected councils at the crucial sub-district level are very weak in 
all Indian states.16  Decentralised systems there empower local and district councils far more 
than the sub-district councils which stand between them on the ladder.  As a result, the people 
at the sub-district level who decide which local preferences to combine into plans are 
bureaucrats and not largely powerless elected councillors.  The architects who designed the 
MGNREGA were well informed about public works programmes and how to achieve 
transparency, but they appear to have been insufficiently aware of this important reality -- 
they were seriously under-informed about the details of democratic decentralisation in 
various Indian states.  This tips the imbalance further in favour of bureaucrats at the sub-
district level, to the disadvantage of elected councils and their leaders at the local level.             
     The fundamental problem here is that, in practice, the MGNREGA has given local 
councils too few powers in relation to those bureaucrats.  As one of the most perceptive 
analysts of the programme recently said -- in a comment which refers to accountability, the 
issue that we will consider next: 
...responsibilities have been dumped on local councils along with significant funds to 
fulfil them.  But councils were not given adequate powers and accountability 
mechanisms.  That suits the higher-level politicians and bureaucrats who influence 
how the system will work.  They are determined to avoid being made accountable, so 
they undermine accountability even at the local level – so that a culture of 
accountability does not develop there.  It might spread upwards, like a virus, to reach 
them.17  
The ‘power deficit’ in elected local councils arises for three reasons.  The first is already 
apparent: transparency mechanisms focus only on actors at the local level and not on 
bureaucrats at higher levels.  Second, local councils have – not on paper but in practice – too 
few powers over decisions under this programme.  Third, and again in practice, the 
MGNREGA has triggered a marked shift in power away from members of local councils to 
their chairpersons (who are squeezed for bribes by bureaucrats at higher levels) – so that the 
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councils as collective bodies are left with limited influence.  This is examined in the 
discussion just below.  And as we shall see, this ‘power deficit’ produces a further problem 
which strikes at another of the three essentials: an ‘accountability deficit’.  
The Redistribution of Power within Local Councils -- and an ‘Accountability Deficit’ 
    The substantial new money that the MGNREGA has brought to local councils, and the new 
responsibilities that it has imposed on them, have altered the distribution of power within 
most councils.  The chairpersons of the councils have become much more powerful in 
relation to other elected members.  Three things are worth noting here.   
     First, because far more money is now available to local councils, chairpersons make much 
more energetic efforts than before to manipulate local politics in ways that strengthen their 
influence over council affairs.  They are driven to do this because it will help them to divert 
money illegally from MGNREGA – partly to enrich themselves, but also to fund bribes that 
must often be paid to bureaucrats at the sub-district level in order to persuade the latter to 
provide various certificates and measurements of public works which are required before 
government funds are fully released to them.   
     Second, the MGNREGA makes council leaders legally responsible for the maintenance of 
numerous registers and records – adding to their already very heavy burden of paperwork – 
so that the total number of such documents now stands at between 19 and 21, depending on 
which Indian state we are discussing.  Other council members do not share in this 
responsibility – which is both bad news and good news for the chairpersons.  It means that 
they must shoulder the heavy workload.  But it also gives them control over the official 
record of what has happened under the MGNREGA – since other councillors seldom inspect 
the documents.  This enhances chairpersons’ power relative to other council members.   
      Third, to make the programme work, frequent meetings with officials at the sub-district 
level are necessary.  And since only the local council chairpersons (and possibly the council 
secretaries – civil servants who assist them) fully understand what has happened at the local 
level – because they keep the records -- they become the sole gatekeepers over such 
interactions.  This again enhances their influence.  Most council members only know what 
the council chairperson tells them about these crucial meetings.18   
     Readers will have noted the use here of the word ‘chairperson’ rather than ‘chairman’.  
There is more to this than political correctness because at least 30 percent, and in some states 
50 percent of the posts as council leaders are reserved for women.  Various proportions of 
these posts are also reserved for members of disadvantaged social (caste) groups.  These 
reservations influence power relations within local councils.  Some women and some 
members of disadvantaged castes (both female and male) who chair local councils have 
                                                 
18
   In some Indian states local council chairpersons are directly elected by voters, while in others they are 
indirectly elected by council members.  But in neither case do other councillors have much leverage over the 
chairpersons.   
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limited political capacity – that is, political awareness, confidence, skills and connections.  
When that is true, they are unable to exercise dominant (or often, even strong) influence over 
council affairs.  Other powerful local leaders, who are sometimes councillors and sometimes 
not, wield great power informally.  But in most local councils, including many whose 
chairpersons hold ‘reserved’ posts, the official leader is very powerful – and has become 
more powerful thanks to the MGNREGA. 
     This has ambiguous implications for the health of local democracy.  Many influential 
chairpersons use their power to benefit diverse social groups within the locality, mainly 
because that is in their political interests.  They want to remain broadly popular in order to get 
re-elected.  Where that is true, local democracy suffers limited damage.  The main change is 
that citizens must reach out not to all councillors but mainly to the chairperson since s/he has 
immense power.  But this does not always happen since some chairpersons do not attend to 
the interests of diverse groups.  And even when it does happen, it damages the capacity of 
other elected members of the council to represent and to meet the needs of their constituents.  
Hence the ambiguity.                        
A Surprising Twist in the Plot: The Introduction of Bank Accounts 
     A year or so after the MGNREGA had been inaugurated, the ministry that administers it in 
New Delhi became worried by reports that when workers were paid in cash, they were often 
cheated of some of their wages.  To prevent this, a change was introduced requiring them to 
be paid through bank accounts.  This idea was strongly supported by India’s Planning 
Commission because it meant that most poor villagers would need to open such accounts, and 
that would lead in turn to their ‘financial inclusion’ in the national banking network – 
opening up channels through which certain other benefits could reach them.  This change has 
had more far-reaching implications than anyone in New Delhi anticipated.  Most importantly, 
it has largely put an end to numerous manoeuvres or tricks which corrupt leaders at the local 
level had earlier used to steal money from workers.       
     A few examples (there are many more19) will illustrate this.  Before bank accounts, 
village-level officials sometimes recorded fewer days on a worker’s job card than s/he has 
actually laboured, and they then entered a larger number of days into the MGNREGA’s IT 
system which is used to determine how much money should go to each worker.  The village 
officials would then pay the workers for the smaller number of days and pocket the rest of the 
money.  When bank accounts were introduced, this became impossible because the wages, 
paid according to data in the IT system, all had to go to their accounts.  The new system cut 
out the middle men.  It is also now extremely difficult for local officials to claim funds for 
non-existent workers, since bank accounts must be created for them, and impersonators must 
withdraw funds from them.  It is now much more complicated to arrange wage payments for 
non-existent local projects, since wages for work allegedly done on them must again pass into 
bank accounts – which makes the scam apparent to workers, and which may give workers 
                                                 
19
   A full picture of the tricks that have been used, and of the ways in which the introduction of bank accounts 
has undercut them, will appear in the book which this writer and Rob Jenkins are producing on the MGNREGA. 
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opportunities to demand a share of the profits or to keep them all.  When the IT records show 
that workers have completed tasks that have actually been performed cheaply by machines, 
profits can only be obtained by local officials when (once again) they make workers aware of 
this and seek a share of the illicit payments which flow into their bank accounts.  When the 
IT system shows that workers have received official wage rates, it is now very difficult to pay 
them less and then pocket the difference -- because the full wage goes into their accounts.  
Here again, workers will inevitably become aware of the manoeuvre because the system is 
now more transparent to them, and they may resist demands for money.     
     The acute problems which corrupt local officials have experienced since the introduction 
of bank accounts are apparent in two ways.  First, before bank accounts were required, many 
people paid substantial bribes to obtain posts at the sub-district level, on the assumption that 
they could make abundant illicit profits from workers’ wages.  Once bank accounts were 
introduced, their hopes were dashed.  As one of them stated: “before, we got the cream”, but 
now, “we are in a loss as some of them had paid up to 1 lakh (100,000 rupees or US$2,196) 
too [sic] get a posting in MGNREGA... now we will not be able to earn anything.”20  Second, 
those who wish to siphon funds from the programme have largely abandoned attempts to 
steal from the 60% of its budget allotted to workers’ wages, and are concentrating on the 40% 
or so which are used to purchase and transport materials for projects.   
     Even before bank accounts were introduced, it was harder to steal money from the 
MGNREGA than from any other Indian government programme – thanks to other 
transparency mechanisms built into the system.  But bank accounts have added an additional 
complication which has helped to make several other transparency mechanisms more 
formidable, and theft more challenging. 
     It is very important that workers’ wages are now largely protected from thieves.  But other 
gains have also occurred.  Many corrupt manoeuvres have become apparent to the potential 
victims, and this newly enhanced transparency has inspired anger, plus greater vigilance and 
assertiveness, among poor people.  In other words, that their political capacity has been 
strengthened by the greater transparency that bank accounts have produced.  Their political 
awareness has increased markedly, and some have mustered the confidence to assert 
themselves in response to attempts to cheat them.  Those who do so acquire new political 
skills and often new political connections to other workers who face similar problems.  This 
change has brought greater pressure on the heads of elected local councils to be downwardly 
accountable.  But in most localities, that has not compensated for the decrease in 
accountability which has occurred.  Over time, however, the enhancement of poor people’s 
political capacity may compel local leaders to become more accountable. 
     Even where greater transparency only or mainly generates frustration among poor people, 
there is a certain utility in it – and it has not emerged unintentionally.  Some of the architects 
of the MGNREGA hoped that the transparency mechanisms in this programme would reveal 
                                                 
20
   This is from the field notes of our research team, recorded in late 2008 in Shivpuri District of Madhya 
Pradesh.   
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misdeeds to poor workers, and foster constructive discontent among them, which would in 
turn inspire action that would strengthen their political capacity.       
     Bank accounts have not been an unmixed blessing for workers.  They have also caused 
serious problems.  Their introduction triggered prolonged slowdowns and even stoppages in 
MGNREGA work in many states, while corrupt officials searched – unsuccessfully -- for 
ways round the new rules.  Lengthy delays in the payment of wages have also occurred.  This 
has enabled private employers, who had been forced by the MGNREGA to pay higher wages, 
to persuade labourers to work for them at lower wages than the programme pays – because 
‘at least we pay on time’.  The number of bank branches is so limited that workers often need 
to travel long distances, and lose a day’s wages, to reach them.  Bank employees sometimes 
turn them away or demand bribes to release funds.  And if workers send intermediaries with 
bundles of account books to extract wages, the latter also sometimes demand bribes.  So the 
gains in income and transparency for workers must be considered alongside these clear 
disadvantages.      
     The impact of bank accounts has also had limitations.  This was authoritatively explained 
by a formidable civil society activist in a decidedly under-developed district of Madhya 
Pradesh state.  She knows whereof she speaks since she has helped the poor villagers there to 
begin to develop the capacity, organisation and inclination to make good use of the 
MGNREGA transparency mechanisms.  She argued that when poor people become capable 
of making local mass meetings, social audits and other mechanisms operate properly, then the 
fundamentals of the socio-political order will begin to change.21  Little of this has yet 
happened in most of rural India.  But the gradual headway that has been made in that district 
and numerous other apparently unpromising places indicates that it is not entirely naive to 
expect pressure from below to become significant enough to enhance downward 
accountability.  When we consider this alongside another basic change that occurred across 
most of the country before the MGNREGA was established, the decline in the power of caste 
hierarchies (for many learned observers, an unthinkable development only a generation ago), 
we must conclude that the view of village India as a stagnant place where inequities and 
injustices are eternal is serious flawed. 
     Her comment also reminds us of other crucial concerns.  The decision from the apex of 
India’s political system to require payments through bank accounts has clearly enhanced the 
transparency of the MNREGA in important ways.  But neither this nor any other change 
imposed from the top will suffice to make this programme and local democracy work well.  
That will only happen when major changes occur from the bottom up.  The introduction of 
bank accounts has reduced the ‘transparency deficit’ in the system, but it has not entirely 
removed it.  And more crucially, local democracy here – despite (and in part because of) the 
recent surge in funds for local councils – is still afflicted by an ‘accountability deficit’.  
Greater transparency will facilitate the further strengthening accountability, mainly from the 
bottom up.  But that will be a slow, difficult, and uncertain process.  We must return to these 
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   Interview with Madhuri Behn, Barwani, 5 December 2008. 
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issues shortly, but they will become clearer if we first consider the roles played by key local 
actors – council leaders – in greater detail.        
The View from the Council Leader’s Office: Three Cases 
     To illustrate some of the variations that we find as we move from locality to locality, here 
are concise profiles of three local council chairpersons in a fairly typical Indian state where 
the MGNREGA has been reasonably well implemented.22  It should be stressed that the first 
two people depicted here are rather untypical, in two senses.  They have little interest in 
stealing money from the programme, and they have (for different reasons) largely eluded 
attempts by bureaucrats at the sub-district level to extort substantial bribes from them.  The 
third chairperson described here is more typical, since he differs from the first two on both 
counts.  These leaders operate in, respectively, a ‘best case’, a ‘worst case’, and an 
ambiguous district. 
A. A formidable woman in a ‘best case’ district:  The first is a woman who has been 
elected to one of the 30 percent of local council chairs that are reserved for women 
candidates.  She comes from a caste which stands near the middle of the old social 
hierarchy, so that caste is neither a great help nor a serious hindrance in her political 
career.  She has received a rudimentary education, including a few years in secondary 
school.  She has certain advantages which are unavailable to most council leaders in 
this state.  She comes from a district that is unusually prosperous and comparatively 
well developed, mainly because it is located near the state capital.  A good road links it 
to the capital, so the district is also quite visible to visitors from outside the state.  
Voters there form part of the support base for the state’s ruling party.  As a result, of 
those last two things, senior politicians in the capital are anxious to ensure that the 
district is well governed.  They have inserted an honest and effective bureaucrat to 
head the district administration, and to minimise corruption within the MGNREGA.  
This chairwoman also receives assistance from a strong, constructive civil society 
organisation.  It has run very effective capacity-building programmes for elected local 
councillors, and has constructed a strong association of council chairpersons – both of 
which have enhanced this woman’s self confidence and her management and 
negotiating skills.  Such support from civil society is available in only a small minority 
of districts in this state.  For all of these reasons, this is a ‘best case’ district.   
     She has an ebullient personality, and it quickly becomes apparent from her 
command of the finer details of the MGNREGA that she has impressive analytical 
skills.  But she is not puffed up with self-importance because she is acutely aware that 
her political future depends on her capacity to serve the villagers who might re-elect 
                                                 
22
   The state is Madhya Pradesh, which is typical in many ways, but rather under-developed.  By choosing a 
state where the MGNREGA has been well implemented, we exclude problems and complications which arise 
for a reason external to the programme -- because a state government manages it poorly.  Interviews with the 
first of these people occurred at a meeting of chairpersons, and with the latter two in their village offices in 
November and December 2008.  I am grateful to Yogesh Kumar and Vashil Naik of the admirable civil society 
organisation Samarthan for assistance in these encounters.  
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her.  That will not be easy since the chairpersons’ posts which are reserved for women 
rotate at the end of every five-year term.  When she seeks re-election, she will face 
competition from male candidates.  Most chairwomen who attempt that are 
unsuccessful.  She is therefore intensely focused on the task of leading the council in a 
responsive, constructive manner.   
     She is intelligent enough to see that the sharp increase in government funds for her 
council from the MGNREGA offers her an opportunity to enrich herself.  But she also 
knows that stealing money is bad politics.  Local democracy is so transparent that 
corruption will not go unnoticed in the way that it often does when it occurs at higher 
levels.  She therefore restrains herself in the hope that a good reputation will enable 
her to defeat male candidates who may have more funds to spend than she does at the 
next election. 
     Independent witnesses state firmly that she has not diverted funds from the 
programme, and that she has refused to provide bribes from the MGNREGA budget to 
bureaucrats at the sub-district level.  When she is asked about this, she explains that 
three things have enabled her to say no.  The first, which she states with fierce pride, is 
her own stubbornness.  “I will not play the game.”  But she quickly adds a second: the 
district’s senior administrator keeps pressing sub-district bureaucrats to implement the 
programme properly, without demanding kickbacks for approvals and measurements 
of the work done by labourers.  And he looks very carefully into proposals from the 
sub-district to prosecute local council chairpersons for misconduct, since he knows 
that these are often used against honest local leaders to force them to provide bribes.  
The third factor is the civil society organisation that is active in her area.  It supports 
local councils with effective efforts to enhance their awareness of the details of the 
MGNREGA and their capacity to administer it.  It can publicise attempts by 
bureaucrats to steal funds from local councils.  And above all, the strong association of 
council leaders that it has helped to create provides a collective defence against 
demands for payoffs.   
     She knows that these things – apart from her stubbornness – are largely or entirely 
unavailable in other parts of this state.  Most district administrators are somewhat less 
energetic and effective than the one here, and a few are deeply corrupt.  Constructive 
civil society organisations operate in strength in only a handful of this state’s 48 
districts.  Most local council chairpersons therefore get no help in developing their 
political capacity, and strong associations of council leaders exist, again, in only a tiny 
number of districts.  So for her, conditions are unusually promising, and 
knowledgeable observers of the local scene say that she has a fighting chance to gain 
re-election at the end of her term.                    
B. An adroit young man in a ‘worst case’ district:  Let us now turn from one of a small 
number of encouraging districts to one of a tiny handful of ‘worst case’ districts in this 
state -- where most districts are ambiguous.  We find no civil society activity of any 
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significance there, and instead of preventing sub-district bureaucrats from diverting 
funds from the MGNREGA, the senior district administrator applies pressure on his 
subordinates to milk the programme aggressively.  This is no accident.  Senior 
politicians in the state capital have inserted him there to do precisely that.  He and sub-
district bureaucrats are permitted to keep portions of the money, but they must also 
pass a hefty percentage up to the state level where a leading figure in the ruling party 
takes charge of it.   
     This district has three characteristics which make it a logical place for such grand 
larceny.  It is located in a region in which the main opposition party is strong, so that 
popular discontent there will do little damage to the ruling party.  The district is remote 
and not served by good communications and roads, so problems there are less likely to 
become visible.  And it is extremely under-developed, so that its impoverished and 
severely under-educated residents are unlikely make much of a fuss. 
     Most heads of local councils there are at the mercy of higher-level bureaucrats, but 
there are a few exceptions.  One of them is a man in his mid-30s who has made the 
most of a secondary education in the poor schools of this poor district.  He is from a 
numerically powerful ‘backward caste’, which in this area – where still lower castes 
comprise much of the population – means that he comes from the lower-middle tier of 
the traditional caste hierarchy.  He shows no signs of social insecurity.  He is bursting 
with self confidence and determination to get useful things done for his constituents, in 
a participatory manner that will strengthen their self esteem, their political skills and 
his popularity.   
     He plainly believes that this has earned him a positive reputation across this region 
of the state.  That is important to him because he is ambitious – he wants to become a 
state legislator.  Leaders of his party which currently governs the state have not yet 
awarded him a ticket for a legislative election, but he is solidly committed to the 
party’s success.  His well appointed office is festooned with party flags and posters.  
He stresses that his ambitions provide a clear incentive to avoid stealing funds from his 
constituents or from government programmes, since a reputation for honesty and 
efficacy are crucial to his long-term political prospects.  Knowledgeable informants 
from this area, and ordinary people in surrounding villages, consistently attest that his 
description of himself is accurate. 
     He is disinclined not just to take bribes but also to pay them to people at the sub-
district level.  He explains how he minimises the latter.  He undertakes no NREGA 
project that costs more than Rs.500,000 ($10,750) because if he goes above that 
amount, he will require approval from block-level officials which will only be 
provided in exchange for a hefty illicit fee.  (If an important local need can only be met 
by spending more than that amount, he splits it into two apparently separate projects, 
each of which costs under Rs.500,000.)  He carefully maintains detailed electronic and 
paper records of all actions taken under the MGNREGA, and he faithfully fills in the 
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21 registers and record books that he is required to provide.  So when officials from 
the sub-district level examine these things, they find no errors which might result in 
demands for bribes in exchange for their silence.  But this man emphasises that most 
other council chairpersons are less confident, less attentive to record keeping, and less 
well connected politically than he is.  Well informed observers add that most of them 
are less committed to their tasks and far less politically adroit.  So across most of this 
‘worst case’ district, council leaders are far more vulnerable to illicit demands from 
higher up.            
But even this able man cannot entirely avoid making payments to sub-district 
officials.  This is because, while the MGNREGA has mightily increased the flow of 
funds to local councils, it has also provided new powers to bureaucrats at the sub-
district level.  In districts like the first one described above, where watchful senior 
officials press their subordinates at that level to restrain themselves from profiteering, 
the squeezing of local council leaders for kickbacks is limited.  But in this ‘worst case’ 
district, senior officials actively encourage such abuses.  This council chairman can 
minimise such payments by scrupulous record-keeping, but he is unable to escape 
demands from bribes when measurements of works are made, or when certificates of 
successful completion are issued.  He knows influential figures at higher levels in his 
party, but his appeals to them for help have produced no response because they are 
outranked by the senior party leader at the state level who receives funds passed 
upward from this district.   
  It bears repeating that in only three or four of this state’s 48 districts is the 
MGNREGA systematically manipulated in this way.  So the number of ‘worst case’ 
districts is quite small.  The leader at the state level who receives funds from ‘worst 
case’ districts has carefully limited their number, so that the state’s overall 
performance under the MGNREGA is reasonably good.  He and his associates know 
that when it works well in most areas, the ruling party gains popularity.   
C. A man of average talents in an ambiguous district:  Finally, consider a more typical 
local council leader in a more typical district.  He is more typical because, in contrast 
to the two people discussed above, he is not particularly adroit, self-confident or well 
connected – he is close to the average on all three counts.  His district is typical 
because, like the great majority of districts in this state, it is neither a ‘best’ nor a 
‘worst’ case.   Senior bureaucrats there do not seek to milk the MGNREGA for illicit 
funds, but they also do little to maintain high standards of conduct.   
     This leaves bureaucrats at the sub-district level with some opportunities to squeeze 
local councils and their leaders for payoffs from MGNREGA funds.  But this is no free 
for all.  Here, as in every part of the state, some of them are sufficiently committed to 
public service and their professional duty to restrain themselves.23  So this local 
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   This comment is based on interviews with the officials themselves and with knowledgeable observers who 
vouched for them, in November and December 2008. 
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council chairman faces demands for sizeable kickbacks from some but not all officials 
at the sub-district level.  But the payments that he must make still represent a financial 
burden that he can only bear by diverting funds from the MGNREGA.  The 
introduction of bank accounts has forced him to rely mainly on phoney or inflated 
invoices for the purchase and the transportation of materials like cement and bricks to 
be used in local works projects.   
     He is alarmed to discover that officials in the sub-district office are beginning to 
centralise the procurement of materials – a widespread trend which has made things 
more difficult for local council chairpersons in much of India.  They claim that they 
are seeking economies of scale, but he believes that they want to maximise their 
control over the 40% or so of the MGNREGA budget which can be used for materials, 
since they (and he) now recognise that bank accounts make thefts from workers’ 
wages an unpromising option.  He – unlike the two leaders discussed above, but like 
most chairpersons in this state – is often forced to undertake public works projects 
preferred by sub-district officials rather than by local residents and councillors.24  He 
has managed to use his control over documentation (including those invoices) to 
centralise power within his council, so his profiteering is not obvious to others in his 
locality.  This concealment is widely resented, but he has managed to sustain some of 
his popularity by ensuring that abundant opportunities for work under the MGNREGA 
go to members of the factions and castes who have voted for him in the past.  But he 
worries that this may not be enough to secure re-election.         
Local Council Chairpersons: Villains or Victims – or Both? 
     Most chairpersons of local councils -- like this last, typical leader -- engage in villainy.  
(So do many council secretaries, the civil servants who assist them.)  The architects of the 
MGNREGA had this in mind when they focused transparency mechanisms only on the local 
level.  Since local officials have been targeted in this way, it is no surprise that these 
mechanisms have mainly revealed misdeeds committed by them, and not by officials at 
higher levels.  In other words, the MGNREGA has reinforced the image of local leaders as 
villains.  This is not entirely misleading, but we need to ask why they have sought to steal 
money from the programme, and whether they are mainly villains or victims -- or perhaps 
both? 
     The answers to these questions are complicated.  Let us begin with provisional comments.  
First, many (though not most) council chairpersons are actually neutral or constructive 
figures, as the profiles above suggest.  Second as those profiles also indicate, many who 
indulge in corruption do so partly because they are victims more than villains – because they 
are squeezed for hefty bribes by actors at the sub-district level.  The main villains are often 
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   Sub-district-level bureaucrats ignore the list of potential projects prepared by the local council and insist that 
they will only issue certificates and approvals if other projects, which they favour, are undertaken.  This enables 
them to earn the admiration of superiors at higher levels who have pressed them to support the state 
government’s interest in certain sectors: road repairs, irrigation or whatever.  
20 
 
found at higher levels, operating beyond the reach of the transparency mechanisms.  But to 
say only this is to oversimplify.  Other things must be considered. 
     Demoralisation is a serious problem among council chairpersons.  It plays nearly as large 
a role as greed in eroding the inclination of many to restrain themselves from stealing 
MGNREGA funds.  It may seem odd that they should be demoralised since we have recently 
witnessed a redistribution of power within local councils that has strengthened their hands.  
But they are disheartened by three things.   
     First, the additional tasks and pressures that have come with the MGNREGA have left 
many feeling overwhelmed.  Their administrative burden has grown substantially – recall that 
they must maintain up to 21 sets of records, and that many get only limited help from often 
semi-capable council secretaries.  And to make matters worse, they face increasingly taxing 
political/diplomatic tasks.  They have to decide how to parcel out work opportunities to poor 
villagers, and/or how to respond to demands for work from them.  They also face pressure 
from (often rich and powerful) contractors who seek a role in MGNREGA projects, despite a 
legal ban on their participation.  And chairpersons must travel two or three times a week 
(often over considerable distances) to sub-district offices to deliver reports, make requests, 
and negotiate both the legitimate details of the projects under this programme and illicit 
demands from officials there for payoffs in exchange for measurements and approvals.  
Given all of these onerous burdens, it is hardly surprising that council leaders – most of 
whom are not especially adroit and self-confident – should suffer demoralisation.  One 
knowledgeable civil society activist in Madhya Pradesh reports seeing several of them 
reduced to tears.25  
     Second, they often find that in practice (though not in theory) they lack the power to 
decide what MGNREGA projects to undertake.  As we saw in the profile of the third 
chairperson just above, sub-district bureaucrats tend to dictate which projects should be 
initiated.  They ignore the list of preferred projects prepared at the local level in order to 
emphasise sectors (irrigation, tree planting, road repairs or whatever) that are dear to the 
hearts of officials at still higher levels.                 
     Third, chairpersons are seriously short of money for their personal use.  They receive 
modest stipends from state governments, but these fail to cover the legitimate costs that they 
incur in their daily routines.  Their trips to sub-district offices are so frequent that travel 
expenses mount up.  Most must also pay literates in their villages to assist in maintaining 
records and in preparing local councils’ plans for higher authorities.  If they are to appear 
responsive enough to be re-elected, they must offer tea to constituents who come calling 
almost every day – a common estimate is 200 visitors per month.  They must provide far 
more generous hospitality to powerful visitors from higher levels who turn up periodically in 
their villages.  To these legitimate expenses we must add two that are more dubious: the need 
of chairpersons to recoup their heavy expenses from the last election campaign and to build 
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   Interview, Bhopal, 21 July 2008.  
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up war chests for the next one; and of course the demands for bribes by bureaucrats at the 
sub-district level for approvals connected to the MGNREGA.   
     These things impose intense pressure upon them to steal from the local councils’ main 
source of funds: the MGNREGA.  This pressure and the demoralisation noted above are at 
least as important as mere greed in inspiring villainy.  Many chairpersons can be seen, at least 
in part, as villains.  But they are also victims – of circumstances, and of demands for bribes 
from higher ups.  There is so much transparency within local arenas that their illicit acts 
become apparent to their neighbours, who are also the voters who elect them.  So to divert 
money from the MGNREGA is to risk unpopularity and defeat at the next election – an 
acutely painful idea.  But the pressures – legitimate and illicit – to acquire funds are so 
intense that most of them feel compelled to steal.  It therefore comes as no surprise to hear 
that some honest, well-meaning chairpersons have decided to stand down from local councils 
at the next election.26          
Increased Funding and Transparency are Insufficient: Accountability is Crucial – and 
Weak 
     To return to our basic question: ‘what happens when local democracy strikes it rich?’  
What have we learned from this particular case, the most generous increase in funding ever 
seen?  Why, despite some encouraging trends, have there also been dsappointments?  The 
MGNREGA has provided tens of millions of poor families with opportunities to earn 
desperately needed wages.  It has more potent transparency mechanisms than any poverty 
programme on earth – and, to a significant degree, they work.  They have made it harder to 
divert funds from this programme than from any other in India.  And yet despite this, elected 
leaders of local councils often steal money from it, and always feel pressure to do so.  The 
main explanation can be found in the new political process which the MGNREGA has set 
loose -- not just at the local level but in the system more broadly, especially between actors at 
the local and the higher, sub-district level.  
     Even though this programme has greatly increased transparency and funds for local 
democracy, it is still beset by three painful difficulties.  First, the enhancement of 
transparency has been too limited.  It has occurred almost entirely at the local level, and 
therefore has done little to restrain destructive action from higher levels.  Second, despite the 
surge in funding, the new political process has inspired demoralisation among leaders of 
elected councils.  Finally and crucially, the increases in funds and transparency are necessary 
but not – on their own – enough.  They must be accompanied by two other things, each of 
which is essential if local democracy is to work well: powers for elected councils, and 
accountability mechanisms.  
     Why are powers for local councils a problem?  The MGNREGA has apparently given 
them the powers to decide how they should spend the massive new funds that it has given 
them -- apparently, but in many localities, not in practice.  The programme has also increased 
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the powers of permission and approval which are exercised by bureaucrats at higher levels -- 
and the latter have used these to disregard local preferences and to force local councils to do 
things which are mandated from above.  The architects of the MGNREGA appear to have 
assumed that elected councils higher up at the sub-district level would prevent bureaucrats 
there from bullying local councils, but the assumption is inaccurate since councils at that 
level are extremely weak in every Indian state.  A five-minute conversation with any of 
India’s numerous experts on democratic decentralisation would have revealed this, but no 
such consultation ever took place.  So the bullying often happens, and it leaves elected 
councils – or at least their leaders – with too little power.   
     That phrase “at least their leaders” in the last sentence is important since it points to the 
other reason that councils have too little power.  We have seen that the MGNREGA has 
triggered a redistribution of power within local councils which has enabled all but the most 
incapable chairpersons to dominate other councillors.  They use their control over record 
keeping, and over negotiations with over-mighty officials up at the sub-district level, to 
deprive the full local councils of the influence that they are supposed to have.  Many of them 
also use their dominant position to elude interrogation by local residents in village-level mass 
meetings. 
     This brings us to the other, more crucial problem – inadequate accountability in this new 
political process.  It is inadequate in three senses.  First, when we see bureaucrats in sub-
district offices bullying local councils, we acknowledge that they are not accountable 
(downwardly) to them, or (horizontally) to toothless elected councils at the sub-district levels.  
Second, when we see chairpersons dominating local councils, we acknowledge that they are 
insufficiently accountable to other elected councillors.  And finally, when we see that local 
council leaders usually avoid interrogation at mass meetings, we acknowledge that they are 
insufficiently accountable to citizens who elected them.  All three types of accountability are 
quite weak -- so on three fronts, we encounter an ‘accountability deficit’.   
     In the years since 2005 when the MGNREGA was introduced – that is, over the short term 
– accountability has been weakened.  Over the longer term, the political capacity of poor 
people will gradually strengthen – thanks to the enhanced transparency that the programme 
makes possible at the local level.  In many villages, that will slowly increase pressure on local 
council leaders to be more downwardly accountable to poor people.  That will ease the 
‘accountability deficit’ – very gradually.  But in the near term, the problem will remain 
serious.        
     These things explain why increased funds for local councils, and the greater transparency 
which the MGNREGA has made possible, are not enough.  The councils have – in practice, 
though not in theory – too little power.  And decisively, the new political process 
malfunctions because it is afflicted by three types of ‘accountability deficit’.  When local 
government strikes it rich, its troubles are far from over.     
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